Smart-TV security: risk analysis and experiments on Smart-TV communication channels by Bachy, Yann et al.
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Smart-TV security
Risk analysis and experiments on Smart-TV communication channels
Yann Bachy · Vincent Nicomette · Mohamed Kaaˆniche · Eric Alata
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract This paper focuses on the security threats
related to smart-TV communication channels. A risk
analysis is carried out to have a global view of potential
risks that need to be addressed in the context of Smart-
TV communication links. The feasibility of several iden-
tified risks is investigated experimentally. The experi-
ments show some relevant security-related vulnerabili-
ties on Smart-TV communications channels. Counter-
measures to address these vulnerabilities are also inves-
tigated.
Keywords Smart-TV · Risk Analysis · Security ·
DVB-T and Communication Channel
1 Introduction
Digital technologies have become widely used in home
networks. At their beginning, the use of home Internet
connections was mostly limited to provide access to the
World Wide Web. More services have been provided
later with the introduction of triple-play offers and the
possibility to watch TV or initiate phone-calls using
the Internet connection. The trend toward making ev-
ery day home equipment “Smart”er has been strength-
ened over the past few years. As an example, kitchens
are being equipped with smart-refrigerators, hospital-
izations can be shortened by medical home equipment,
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and more and more domestic tasks can be supported
by different smart automation systems. Many of these
smart devices run operating systems and are connected
to each other, through several networks, allowing them
to interact and to be accessed remotely through the In-
ternet. As a consequence, the security of such devices
has become a real concern[13].
A typical example concerns smart-TVs. Besides re-
ceiving TV programs using an aerial antenna or a satel-
lite dish, these new-generation TVs integrate an oper-
ating system running several applications and an inter-
net connection, allowing them to offer more services to
the users. Protocols, such as HbbTV1, allow TV service
providers to broadcast interactive Internet content si-
multaneously with their live TV shows. From a security
point of view, two important aspects must be consid-
ered. Firstly, like any other embedded device, the em-
bedded software may contain vulnerabilities that could
be exploited by an attacker. Secondly, the simultaneous
connectivity of the TV to several networks offer the op-
portunity to an attacker to use the TV as a gateway
between these networks. Clearly, smart-TVs could rep-
resent a real security threat for home networks. Thus,
it is important to carry out a global security analysis
in order to identify potential threats and vulnerabilities
and then investigate protection mechanisms to mitigate
the related security risks.
To our knowledge, such a global security analysis
has not been carried out so far. The first part of this ex-
panded version of our article presented at the 45th an-
nual IEEE/IFIP International conference on Depend-
able Systems and Networks (DSN 2015) [2] is aimed at
filling this gap by studying the communication chan-
nels of a Smart-TV. EBIOS, an industrial risk analysis
1 Hybrid Broadcast Broadband TV
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method developed by the French Network and Infor-
mation Security Agency (ANSSI), is used to draw a
global picture of the relevant risks, including those cited
above, induced by the usage of smart-TVs in a home
network. The second part describes the experiments we
have carried out in order to illustrate the feasibility of
attack scenarios corresponding to several vulnerabilities
identified during the risk analysis.
We analyze in particular the security of two com-
munication channels used by smart TVs: i) a bidirec-
tional internet-based communication channel between
the smart-TV and its service provider, and ii) a unidi-
rectional communication channel for aerial TV broad-
casts. The main lessons learned from our experiments
concern 1) the fact that DVB broadcasts are not au-
thenticated and are vulnerable to malicious attacks and
2) the fact that remote servers, such as software update
servers, are not systematically authenticated and can be
replaced by an illegitimate one using the ISP local loop.
We have shown that it is possible to insert malicious
traffic that could compromise the security of a smart
TV, but also the security of other devices connected
through the local network using the smart TV Inter-
net connection. The last part of this paper discusses
some countermeasures that could address the identified
vulnerabilities.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents some related works that investigated differ-
ent security issues of Smart-TVs. Section 3 presents
the risk analysis we carried out, allowing us to get a
global vision of the security threats smart-TV commu-
nication channels may be concerned by. More specifi-
cally, we explain how this risk analysis leads us to an-
alyze the security of ADSL Internet connections and
aerial DVB broadcasts. Then, Sections 4 and 5 present
a set of experiments that allowed us to analyze the pos-
sible exploitation of some security related vulnerabili-
ties discovered during the risk analysis. Then, Section 6
presents some countermeasures to cope with the risks
we analyzed experimentally in this paper. Finally, Sec-
tion 7 concludes and outlines some perspectives for fu-
ture work.
2 Related works
In the coming few years almost 90% of the world-wide
annually sold TVs will be smart-TVs [17] [10]. More-
over, many new smart-applications are taking profit of
these smart-TVs in order to interact with the end-user.
The popularity of these new-generation TVs makes
them more and more attractive for attackers. This sec-
tion gives an overview of some relevant vulnerabilities
presented in related works, most often on newsgroups
or technical blogs.
Many security issues often concern vulnerabilities
where the end-users privacy is put in danger.
In [16], authors discuss an interesting feature of a
specific Smart-TV which allows the user to control it’s
TV by voice commands. A quick analysis of the data
sent out by the TV firstly shows that this feature is
handled by a third party and secondly that the com-
munication channel is not encrypted. This means any
attacker, capable of intercepting data between the TV
and the third party servers on the Internet is capable
of listening to what is happening in the vicinity of the
TV.
In [11] authors discuss how a specific smart-TV reg-
ularly sends viewing information about the programs
watched regardless whether the specific collection
of watching info option is switched on or off. Traf-
fic analysis clearly indicates the smart-TV reports
the channel being watched, and even worse, filenames
stored on an external mass storage device, which could
possibly contain sensitive private data.
In [14], the authors show that it is possible to de-
termine the channel being watched based on statistical
analysis determining the HbbTV page retrieved by the
TV.
Other security issues exist. They often concern the
possibility of impacting the integrity of smart-TVs.
In [21] authors study the possibility to modify the
firmware of a Smart-TV, thereby impacting its in-
tegrity. Although the original firmware is encrypted
using AES keys2, the author was able to decode the
firmware’s content using tools provided by Altinyurt [1].
However, the author was unable to generate a modified
firmware without a valid signature. Moreover, the au-
thor shows that it is possible to install some malicious
widgets on the TV provided that the attacker has a
physical access to the smart-TV in order to proceed
with the installation of an unsigned application.
In [18], the authors were able to obtain a shell access
on several smart-TVs by exploiting vulnerabilities in
the smart-TV’s multimedia player, without any phys-
ical access to the smart-TV. The wide usage of such
integrated multimedia player could increase the likeli-
hood of occurrence of such attacks.
In [3,4] the author studied possible attack scenarios
through the service port located on the back of his
smart-TV. The author initially showed that, thanks to
1) debug information captured at the service interface
and 2) the exploitation of a network vulnerability
(directory traversal), it is possible to extract the
2 Advanced Encryption Standard [9]
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binary managing firmware updates. By analyzing this
binary, the author was able to decode the firmwares of
this TV and thereby analyze their content. At a second
time, the author discovered the presence of a UPnP
library containing a documented vulnerability. Thanks
to all this information, the author was able to carry
out a buffer overflow attack allowing him to activate a
SSH server.
The following observations can be derived from the
state of the art discussed above :
– All these studies address only one specific security
issue individually;
– All the security issues pointed out use classical at-
tack paths;
– Most of these published attacks target one specific
TV brand at once.
More recent works point out new original attack
paths which must also be considered. In [19] authors
discuss the possibility to attack a smart-TV using data
included in modern DVB-T TV broadcasts. This work
has been technically validated in [2].
In this paper, a risk-analysis, based on the EBIOS
method, is used in order to get a global view of poten-
tial risks that need to be addressed in the context of
Smart-TV communication channels, without consider-
ing one particular brand or model. Our goal, on the first
hand, is to identify new remote attack paths that can
take benefit of the different communication interfaces
of a Smart TV, and on the second hand, to develop
an experimental testbed allowing us to investigate the
feasibility of the identified attacks and to assess their
potential impact. Relevant countermeasures to address
such attacks are also investigated.
In the following section, we describe the risk analy-
sis we have carried out on smart-TVs. We present the
EBIOS methodology step by step, its application to
smart-TVs and the conclusions we have derived from
the analysis.
3 Risk analysis
Risk analysis methods address risk assessment and
risk management. Many risk analysis methods exist
(MEHARI (CLUSIF, 1997), OCTAVE (CERT, 1999),
EBIOS (ANSSI, 1995),...). In our study, we used EBIOS
as it has been developed by the French Network and Se-
curity Agency (ANSSI) and it is considered as a stan-
dard in France. Let us note the results of a Risk analysis
are subjective according to the judgment of the analyst.
However this can’t affect the final results of the study.
Module 1
Context
study
Module 2
Study of
feared
events
Module 3
Study of
threat
scenarios
Module 4
Risk
study
Module 5
Security
controls
Fig. 1 The EBIOS method in 5 modules
This section is structured as follows. Firstly, we
rapidly give an overview of the main activities car-
ried out in the context of the EBIOS risk analysis
method. Secondly, we present the results of the ap-
plication of this method to smart-TVs and the rele-
vant security related risks and threats that have been
identified. Finally, possible counter-measures to miti-
gate these threats are discussed in Section 6.
3.1 EBIOS
Figure 1 presents the workflow defined by the EBIOS
method. The risk analysis is decomposed into five main
activities referred to as Modules. The first four modules
are aimed at identifying and assessing relevant threats
and associated risks, and the last module is dedicated
to risk management.
Module 1, Context Study, consists in defining the
context of the risk analysis. The results of the risk anal-
ysis highly depend on this definition as each context
may not take into consideration the same user profile
or point of view, and thereby may not have the same
security needs. The context includes the definition of
the different metrics that are used all along the study
as well as the perimeter of the study. This module also
defines the main assets and supporting assets (terms de-
fined in EBIOS which we will discuss later) as well as ex-
isting security measures to be taken into account while
defining security controls (Module 5). Modules 2 and
3, Study of feared events and Study of threat scenarios
both contribute to the risk assessment. Module 2 defines
the feared events by identifying the security require-
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ments for each main asset as well as the impact in case
these requirements are not met. It also defines the dif-
ferent possible sources of each threat. Module 3 identi-
fies the potential scenarios that could lead to the feared
events. Therefore, this module studies the threats that
the sources could cause and exploitable vulnerabilities.
Module 4, Risk study, confronts the feared events with
the threat scenarios in order to obtain the different risks
faced by the system. Module 5, Security controls, man-
ages the risks identified previously by proposing coun-
termeasures to be implemented.
In the rest of this section, we use the terms defined
by the English version of the EBIOS method3. These
terms are identified with the following font-type the
first time they are used: EBIOS term.
In the following, we describe in more detail each
module and present the results illustrating its applica-
tion to the smart-TV case study.
3.2 Module 1: Context study
3.2.1 Objectives and boundaries of the study
The main goal of this study is to draw a global picture
of the risks related to the usage of a smart-TV in a home
environment. We consider a private usage of a smart-
TV, and we adopt the point of view of the end-user. It is
important to note that we do not focus on one particu-
lar smart-TV, instead we consider the general functions
commonly implemented and used by most smart-TVs.
Figure 2 illustrates a typical home network containing a
Smart-TV with its multiple connections. In our use case
we do not consider other devices on the local network in
the house, that could also be compromised and perpe-
trate attacks on the Smart TV. We consider that such
attacks are well-known and are thus out of the scope of
this paper. In particular, two communication channels
with the outside world are highlighted and explored in
more detail in our study: 1) TV broadcasts though an
aerial antenna or a satellite dish and 2) the local loop
allowing the home network to be connected to the In-
ternet.
In this context, we have identified nine threat
sources presented in Table 1. In order to simplify the
results of our study, we do not specify the capacities of
each threat source. Indeed, EBIOS usually defines three
capacity levels (weak, important and unlimited).
The “Human” column defines whether the source is
human or not. For example, natural catastrophes or
viruses don’t need the immediate interaction of a hu-
man. The “Int/Ext” column localizes the source within
3 https://adullact.net/projects/ebios2010/
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Fig. 2 Case Study: Smart-TV in a home network
the defined perimeter, in our case the user’s home.
The last column, “Malicious”4, distinguishes mali-
cious sources from accidental ones.
Table 1 Threat sources
Threat sources Human Int/Ext Malicious
Malicious in-home user X Int X
Clumsy in-home user X Int
Malicious outside person nearby X Ext X
Malicious outside person X Ext X
TV Operator X Ext
VoD Operator X Ext
TV Manufacturer X Ext
Virus5 Ext X
Weather problems Ext
5. Represents any malware spreading automatically.
3.2.2 Metrics definition
All along this study, we will be using different scales,
which need to be defined. Indeed, each component of
the studied system is evaluated according to several se-
curity criteria. These criteria correspond to the com-
mon security properties : Availability, Confidentiality
and Integrity. In the context of this study we included
the authenticity property also. For each one of these
properties, it is necessary to define a scale for grad-
ing the importance of the expected requirements. The
four criteria with their corresponding requirement lev-
els are presented in Table 2. Let us note that these
levels should correspond to the general needs and the
tolerance of a user of the system. The EBIOS referen-
tial proposes standard scales on which are based the
requirement levels we used in our study.
In EBIOS, risks are ranked according to their level
of severity and their likelihood. In order to obtain this
ranking, EBIOS combines the severity of each feared
event and the likelihood of each threat scenario
(these terms will be discussed later). The scales we used
4 The EBIOS tool uses the term “malevolant”, we prefer to
use malicious.
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Table 2 Security criteria
Availability
Requirement Description
1 More than 4h Unavailability above 4h accepted
2 Between 1h and 4h Unavailability between 1h and 4h accepted
3 Between 1m and 1h Unavailability between 1m and 1h accepted
4 Less than 1m Unavailability below 1m accepted
Integrity
Requirement Description
1 Acceptable No need for integrity
2 Detectable The alteration must be identifiable
3 Restrained The alteration must be identified and corrected
4 Comply The integrity must be enforced
Confidentiality
Requirement Description
1 Public No need for confidentiality
2 Reserved Accessible to a well defined limited group of persons
or entities
3 Private Accessible to one well defined specific person or entity
Authenticity
Requirement Description
1 Unknown No need for authenticity
2 Identified Identity declared, without guarantee of integrity
3 Authentic Identity proven
Table 3 Severity scale
Level Description
1 Negligible No impact noticed
2 Limited Minimal impact
3 Important Severe but recoverable impact
4 Critical Important impact, unrecoverable or with great diffi-
culty
Table 4 Likelihood scale
Level Description
1 Minimal Once every 5 years
2 Significant Once a year
3 Maximal Daily
in our study to evaluate the severity and the likelihood
are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
3.2.3 Asset identification
An EBIOS risk analysis decomposes the system into
main assets and supporting assets. Main assets are
defined as the informational patrimony or immaterial
assets of the system which need to be protected. In
our context, they are defined by identifying the main
services delivered by the system. The supporting as-
sets correspond to the different components support-
ing the implementation of the main assets. EBIOS
defines nine pre-defined types of supporting assets:
premises, systems, hardware, software, networks,
organizations, persons, papers or (interpersonal)
channels.
Considering our case study, we identified five main
assets corresponding to the five main functionalities
commonly provided by most smart-TVs:
– Linear TV: Television service where the viewer has
to watch a scheduled TV program at the partic-
ular time its offered, and on the particular channel
it’s presented on. Hereinafter we only consider aerial
connections, also known as terrestrial transmissions,
which is the most used support over the world[8].
– VoD6: Service allowing the user to watch videos
(movies, TV-shows, etc.) on demand.
– PVR7: Service allowing the user to record a linear
TV-show on a physical storage device, such as a
hard-drive for example.
– Interactive TV (iTV): Service allowing the user
to interact with a linear TV-show or to access other
specific related content.
– Network Media Player (NMP): Service allow-
ing the user to watch multimedia content available
through the local network and standard web-access.
One or several supporting assets are associated to
each one of these main assets. In this study we selected
a limited number of high-level supporting assets. If it
reveals that more details are necessary, the analyst can
either reiterate the risk analysis or conduct a new risk
analysis on a specific sub-system. For this study we
identified the following supporting assets:
– Organization (ORG): TV operator, VoD provider.
– Network (NET): Internet access, local area net-
work, TV broadcast.
– Software (SOF): Embedded software.
Table 5 presents the contribution of each supporting
asset to the five main assets of the system.
Table 5 Relationships between supporting and main assets
Main assets
Supporting Linear
VoD PVR
Interactive
NMP
assets TV TV
NET - Internet ac-
cess
X X
NET - Local area
network
X X X
NET - TV broad-
cast
X X X
SOF - Embedded
software
X X X X X
ORG - TV opera-
tor
X X X
ORG - VoD
provider
X
The last step of the context study is dedicated to
the identification of existing security measures. These
6 Video on Demand
7 Personal Video Recorder
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security measures may be specifically integrated in the
device or should be available in the usual environment.
1. Physical protection offered by the premises
(home) of the user against bad weather conditions
but also against unauthorized physical access to the
device. This allows to reduce the likelihood of phys-
ical attacks on the TV.
2. Network Address Translation offered by most
home IADs8 preventing devices, such as smart-TVs,
connected to the local area network from being di-
rectly exposed to the Internet.
3. Signed Firmwares preventing man in the middle
attacks from altering the embedded software and
thus the behavior of a smart-TV.
This concludes the context study. We have now
identified the main and supporting assets, existing se-
curity measures and the different security metrics for
our study. The next two modules evaluate the security
requirements and the impact in case these requirements
are not respected.
3.3 Module 2: Study of feared events
Feared events are events during which a security re-
quirement for a specific main asset is not fulfilled, for
example: Linear TV availability. In other words, this
module defines for each security criteria of each main
asset:
– the expected security requirement,
– the possible sources of the threats that could pre-
vent the system from fulfilling the expected require-
ment,
– the possible impacts in case a security requirement
is not met, and
– the severity of the impact.
We defined the following impacts in the context of
this study: Inactivity, No information (or incorrect in-
formation) displayed, Loss of private data9, Financial
loss and Activity disclosure.
The idea here, is to represent the requirements of
an average domestic usage of a Smart-TV. Table 6 in-
dicates the severity of the impact in case the security
requirement of a main asset is not met.
Instead of discussing the detailed list of feared
events resulting from the application of this approach
8 Most public internet providers include an Integrated Ac-
cess Device (IAD) with their offer. These IADs have NAT
activated by default.
9 We consider recordings made by the PVR just like any
other private data stored on the Smart-TV.
Table 6 Severity of the impact in case a security requirement
is not met
Security criteria
Main
Availability Integrity Confidentiality Authenticity
assets
Linear
TV
Critical Limited Important Important
VoD Limited Limited Important Limited
PVR Negligible Limited Important Limited
Interactive
TV
Negligible Limited Important Critical
NMP Negligible Limited Important Important
to our smart-TV case study (which would be tedious),
we focus on two particular feared events that will be
detailed in the second part of this paper.
The two feared events that we considered as the
most relevant ones and that will be the subject of the
second part of this paper, are:
Linear TV - Authenticity
The feared event in this case corresponds to a malicious
TV broadcast.
– Security requirement: The displayed information
should be authentic (Apart from distraction, tele-
vision is an important medium for the broadcast of
official and possibly critical information.)
– Threat sources: malicious external person nearby
home.
– Impacts: no information (or incorrect information is
displayed).
– Severity: important (Although television can be
used to inform the population, it is not the only
medium used).
Interactive TV - Authenticity
This feared event corresponds to a modification of the
data included in a TV broadcast allowing a TV set to
interact with the TV channel which is being watched.
– Security requirement: The information displayed
should be authentic (Interactive TV needs local
code execution on the TV set, this code should not
affect the security of the TV set).
– Threat sources: malicious external person nearby
home, TV Operator, virus.
– Impacts: no information (or incorrect information
displayed).
– Severity: critical (Interactive TV needs local code
execution on the TV set, it is vital to be able to
identify the source of this code.)
3.4 Module 3: Study of threat scenarios
This module consists in evaluating the likelihood of
each threat scenario that corresponds to the failure of
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Table 7 Likelihood of threat scenario execution
Supporting
assets
Availability Integrity Confidentiality Authenticity
Internet access Significant Minimal Minimal Significant
Local area
network
Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal
TV Broadcast Minimal Maximal - Significant
Embedded soft-
ware
Minimal Minimal Significant Significant
TV Operator Minimal Minimal Significant Significant
VoD Provider Significant Minimal Significant Significant
a specific security requirement for one supporting as-
set. Therefore, it requires to identify, for each security
criteria, and for each supporting asset:
– the potential threat sources,
– the threats,
– the likelihood of the threat scenario occurrence.
Like in the previous module, instead of giving the
detail for each “supporting asset / security criteria”
combination, Table 7 indicates the occurrence likeli-
hood of each threat scenario. We did not evaluate the
threat scenario concerning the confidentiality of a TV
broadcast which makes no sense by definition. Let us
focus on three examples:
TV Broadcast - Authenticity
This threat scenario corresponds to a malicious replace-
ment of the TV broadcast channel used by the TV in
order to receive the contents of TV channels.
– Threat sources: malicious person nearby home.
– Threats: data altered.
– Likelihood: Significant.
Internet Access - Authenticity
This threat scenario corresponds to a malicious replace-
ment of the Internet channel used by the TV in order
to access interactive services over the Internet.
– Threat sources: malicious person nearby home,
virus.
– Threats: data altered, medium replaced.
– Likelihood: Significant.
Internet Access - Confidentiality
This threat scenarios corresponds to a disclosure of data
sent or received by the smart-TV.
– Threat sources: malicious person nearby home,
virus.
– Threats: data disclosed.
– Likelihood: minimal.
At this stage, we have identified the feared events
and threat scenarios that are relevant to our smart-TV
case study. The fourth module of EBIOS will combine
these in order to define the associated risks.
3.5 Module 4: Risk study
This module consists in combining the data gathered
during modules two and three in order to identify the
risks that are relevant to the target system. The EBIOS
method proposes two options to identify these risks.
The first method considers each threat scenario cor-
responding to each feared event individually.
Example: Network Media Player The availability of the
Network Media Player can be affected by the unavail-
ability of the local area network or the unavailability of
the embedded software (cf. Table 5). When considering
the other security criteria (cf. Table 2), we obtain the
same relationships between threat scenario and feared
events. Finally this method would lead to 8 risks for the
Network Media Player as shown in Table 8.
Table 8 Severity of the impact in case a security requirement
is not met
Security criteria
Supporting
Availability Integrity Confidentiality Authenticity
assets
NET - Local
area network
Risk 1 Risk 2 Risk 3 Risk 4
SOF - Em-
bedded soft-
ware
Risk 5 Risk 6 Risk 7 Risk 8
The second method only considers the feared events.
Their likelihood is then calculated by determining the
maximum likelihood of the corresponding threat sce-
narios.
Example: Network Media Player The authenticity of
the Network Media Player is considered as one risk,
thereby combining the impact of a non-authentic lo-
cal area network and non-authentic embedded software.
Considering the likelihood of these two threat scenarios
are respectively Minimal and Significant, the likelihood
of this risk is Significant. By applying the same ap-
proach for the other security criteria we obtain 4 risks
for the Network Media Player.
For our case study, the first method leads to 60 risks.
This would give a very detailed view to an analyst. The
second method leads to 20 risks. This allows the analyst
to obtain a global overview of all the risks the system
is concerned by.
In this study we applied the second option, allowing
us to obtain a “severity-likelihood” view of all the risks
of our system. These risks are represented in Table 9.
Four different color zones are defined to distinguish
the corresponding risk “level”. In the following, we
will focus on the threats belonging to the “red zone”
which includes the risks for which severity is Critical
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Table 9 Risk analysis
Likelihood
Severity Minimal Significant Maximal
Negligible PVR availability
NMP availability
iTV availability
Limited
VoD integrity
NMP integrity
VoD availability
VoD authenticity
PVR authenticity
TV integrity
PVR integrity
iTV integrity
Important TV confidentiality
TV authenticity
VoD confidentiality
PVR confidentiality
iTV confidentiality
NMP confidentiality
NMP authenticity
Critical TV availability iTV authenticity
and likelihood is Significant or Maximal, and those
for which the severity is Important and the likelihood
Maximal. This zone contains one risk:
Interactive TV non authentic (iTV authentic-
ity)
Interactive TV is an application displaying interactive
content on the TV screen10. The interactive content
can be provided either through the TV broadcast, or
through the Internet connection. This application is
part of the embedded software11 of the TV. This leads
us to explore two different threat scenarios:
– authenticity of the TV broadcast, transporting the
initial configuration of Interactive TV and in some
cases the Interactive TV content. Therefore, we de-
cided to analyze the security of a DVB broadcast
reception.
– authenticity of the Internet access, through which
software updates and in many cases the Interactive
TV content are received. Therefore we decided to
analyze the security of domestic Internet connec-
tions. These internet connections are composed of a
series of different communication channels of which
we will analyze the local loop.
Indeed, the TV broadcast and the local loop are two
privileged networks between the service providers and
the user, in the sense that each communication must
transit over these communication channels. Moreover,
these communication channels are easily identifiable,
since they reach the user’s home. To our knowledge,
very few related works addressed the security analysis
of these networks.
10 In this study we focus on the integrity of the interactive
content and not the application processing this content.
11 Considering our study only focuses on communication
channels we will hereinafter either use the term software or
embedded software to refer to any software of a smart-TV
The next part of this paper is aimed at analyz-
ing experimentally potential attacks related to these
two threat scenarios and exploring possible counter-
measures to face them. Firstly, the following section
briefly presents some technical solutions: i) to observe
the communication traffic between a smart-TV and a
service provider, and ii) to simulate the behavior of a
service provider and illustrate different examples of at-
tack scenarios. The results are discussed in Section 5.
4 Experimental setup
This section describes the solutions we have used or de-
veloped in order to conduct our experiments. Some of
these solutions are based on existing software, others
require a specific hardware setup. These platforms al-
lowed us to carry out some comparative studies which
are presented in section 5. For each communication
channel (ADSL local loop & DVB broadcast) studied,
we proceed in two steps 1) analyze and understand the
legitimate traffic and behavior of the network, and 2)
simulate the service provider on the other side of the
network, that interacts with the smart-TV.
4.1 ADSL local loop
The first study that we have carried out focuses on the
analysis of the local loop supporting the ADSL net-
work. This network was historically installed for pub-
lic switched telephone networks (PSTNs). Besides tele-
phony, this network now transports other services such
as Internet and TV. This implies that many data com-
munications, possibly critical, use this network.
There are 4 main physical supports used for the local
loop: copper pair, coaxial, fiber optics and radio waves.
We hereinafter only consider copper pair local loops.
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The method developed in our study can be applied to
any kind of local loop by using analogous hardware.
This copper pair is terminated by a MoDem (Modulator
and Demodulator) on the user’s side, and by a DSLAM
(Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer) on the In-
ternet provider’s side. These two equipments modulate
and de-modulate a digital signal into
analog signals which are transmitted over the copper
pair.
4.1.1 Traffic observation setup
This setup is intended to observe any traffic on a copper
pair local loop and is composed of a DSLAM and an
ADSL modem.
IAD Modem DSLAM ISP
DSLAM HUB Modem
Observation machine
copper pair copper pair
ethernet ethernet
Fig. 3 Local loop traffic capturing
The DSLAM and modem at each end of the copper
pair fulfill the exact opposite operation of each other.
Indeed, the modulation used on the up-stream differs
from the one used on the down-stream. Therefore, it
is possible to physically cut the line and insert a new
DSLAM and a new ADSL modem, while preserving the
connectivity between the customer and the Internet ser-
vice provider. In fact, this modification changes the way
the IAD communicates with the provider’s DSLAM:
it synchronizes and communicates with the inserted
DSLAM; the inserted DSLAM communicates with the
inserted ADSL modem which, in turn, synchronizes and
communicates with the provider’s DSLAM. As the lo-
cal network interface included in both modems and
DSLAM is most of the time Ethernet, this setup fi-
nally consists in transforming one copper line into two
copper lines interconnected by an Ethernet LAN (see
Figure 3). As sniffing Ethernet LAN traffic is very easy,
the communications sent and received by the IAD, or
any other smart-device connected to the home network,
can be observed.
4.1.2 Service provider simulation setup
This platform simulates a service provider based on
the knowledge of our target system acquired using the
traffic observation platform or other reverse engineer-
ing techniques. Here, instead of connecting the inserted
DSLAM to the provider’s network using a modem, we
connect it to a computer capable of simulating the be-
havior of the Internet service provider, which in turn is
connected to a second computer capable of simulating
the service provider of our target system (cf. Figure 4).
The installation of these servers is accomplished step by
step following an iterative method. We cyclically reboot
the target system (IAD for the ISP simulator, Smart-
TV for the Online Service Simulator), observe any re-
quest coming from the target system and answer it by
installing corresponding software based on the knowl-
edge we have of the target system.
IAD Modem
Legitimate
Online Service
Smart TV
Online Service
Simulator
DSLAM ISP
DSLAM
ISP
Simulator
Home
Fig. 4 Simulating an online service
4.2 DVB Broadcasts
The second service provider network we have tested is
the aerial DVB-T system used for digital Television. TV
broadcasts are generally considered as trustworthy. Tra-
ditional television is based on only one unidirectional
communication system, which implies that consumers
do not have to worry about privacy. With Digital TV
and smart-TVs, even though DVB-T is still a unidirec-
tional communication channel, it is not the only mean
of communication: TV broadcasts tend to take bene-
fit of the internet access to propose more interactive
content. Therefore previous assumptions are no longer
valid, which makes it relevant to analyze the security
of smart-TV communication channels. DVB Broadcast
security concerns have already been investigated[19] us-
ing some relevant aspects of modern Smart-TVs. How-
ever, to our knowledge there is a lack of experimental
studies aimed at exploring possible attack paths and
scenarios exploiting the new functionalities and services
implemented in smart TVs. We hereinafter present the
solutions we have used to conduct some comparative
studies on different types of smart-TVs available on the
market.
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Fig. 5 DVB Experimentation platform
4.2.1 DVB
DVB is a suite of standards for digital television trans-
mission[22]. It allows transmission of MPEG-2 Trans-
port Streams, containing multiple video, audio or data
streams, over several supports such as satellite, aerial or
cable connections. Hereinafter we only consider aerial
connections, also known as terrestrial transmissions,
which is the most used support over the world[8]. Such
aerial transmissions are terminated by a DVB-T de-
modulator at the user’s side, and by a DVB-T modula-
tor at the provider’s side.
4.2.2 Traffic observation setup
The objective is to observe every stream received by
a TV tuned into a specific frequency. As listening
to a DVB-T broadcast signal is implemented by any
TV, this solution does not require any specific hard-
ware. Any off the shelf DVB-T demodulator can be
used. Open-source software such as DVBSnoop12 allows
DVB MPEG stream analysis. We use tzap software13
to tune the demodulator into the target frequency.
4.2.3 DVB Broadcast simulation solution
This solution is intended to simulate a legitimate DVB
broadcast. In order to broadcast a valid DVB channel,
we need a DVB valid MPEG TS and a DVB-T mod-
ulator. Many popular open-source applications such as
ffmpeg14 and vlc15, are capable of generating and mod-
ulating MPEG TSs. However, these applications cannot
be used to obtain a DVB valid MPEG TS as they are
12 http://dvbsnoop.sourceforge.net/
13 http://www.linuxtv.org/wiki/index.php/LinuxTV dvb-
apps
14 https://www.ffmpeg.org/
15 http://www.videolan.org/vlc/
not able to create DVB-required signaling tables. This
can be achieved by the opensource application: Avalpa
OpenCaster16. This task can be initiated by capturing
a legitimate signal (cf. Figure 5 - traffic observation).
Since broadcasting TV without a license is prohib-
ited in most countries, DVB modulators are generally
not available off-the-shelf. During our experiments, we
have used two solutions. The first one uses hardware
suggested by OpenCaster, which can be purchased on-
line. This DVB modulator functions “out-of-the-box”
with OpenCaster, but is limited in some modulation
parameters, i.e., it only supports QPSK or QAM16 con-
stellations, considerably reducing the available band-
width. Since many countries use the QAM64 constella-
tion, this hardware is unable to entirely simulate a DVB
Multiplex. The second platform we have experimented
requires more expensive SDR (Software Defined Radio)
hardware. In our case, we used the Ettus N210 with
the WBX daughterboard. Using GNU-Radio17 makes
it possible to turn such a device into any kind of radio
modulator, including a DVB-T modulator. The popu-
larity of GNU-Radio allowed us to find an entire DVB-
T modulation scheme[5] online. Combining one of these
two hardware solutions with OpenCaster allowed us to
set up a fully functional DVB-T modulator (cf. Figure 5
- simulation).
When considering wired networks, physically con-
necting the end user to the simulation platform forces
the end users terminal to communicate with this plat-
form. In our case, using an aerial transmission, one can-
not just plug out the legitimate service provider and
plug in our simulation platform instead. We need to
crush the legitimate signal, which can be done by trans-
mitting with significantly more power or by approach-
ing the victim’s antenna in such a way that our signal
will be perceived as being significantly stronger than
the legitimate signal. The International Telecommuni-
cation Union defines [15] safety ratios, to make sure
a weaker signal won’t interfere. Thus, if one transmits
above these safety ratios, the emitted signal crushes the
legitimate one, and any TV around considers this signal
rather than the legitimate one (cf. Figure 6).
It is important to note that we did not carry out
large-scale experiments. Instead, we limited our experi-
ments to our research lab, making sure that our exper-
iments did not interfere with any legitimate signal.
16 http://www.avalpa.com/the-key-values/15-free-
software/33-opencaster
17 http://gnuradio.org/
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Fig. 6 Signal crushing
5 Experimental results
We used the traffic observation and service provider
simulation platforms described in Section 4 to carry
out several experiments on a panel of four main-brand
mid-range Smart-TVs, which were the most sold
smart-TVs in Europe for 2013, and are therefore
representative of the average domestic smart-TV. All
have an Ethernet connection and implement a “smart”
environment including standard applications such as
a Web-Browser and VoD. Hereinafter, these TVs are
anonymously referenced as A, B, C and D.
The first set of experiments uses the local loop se-
tups in order to analyze and compare the communica-
tion protocols used between a Smart-TV and different
online services, and their configuration. As the embed-
ded software of a smart-TV is a very critical element,
a first experiment focuses on potential vulnerabilities
and potential attacks targeting the procedure used for
updating embedded software. Hereby we address one
of the most important threat scenarios addressing the
risks related to integrity problems.
A second experiment focuses on the smart-TV’s
integrated Web browser and its compliance to the
same-origin security policy18. Hereby we address
another important threat scenario, that could affect
the integrity of smart-TVs and other devices connected
to the same computer network.
The second set of experiments uses our DVB Broad-
casting platforms, allowing us to analyze and compare
the behavior of each Smart-TV when receiving legiti-
mate and compromised TV signals. A first experiment
shows an interesting way of compromising a DVB-T
Broadcast. Hereby we address threat scenarios related
to linear and interactive TV authenticity risks.
A second experiment analyzes again the compliance
to the same-origin security policy, but now using the
18 The same-origin security policy defines that the local ex-
ecution of a code (i.e. javascript), downloaded from a remote
Web site, cannot send data to a Web site who’s origin (URL)
differs from the one of the original Web site.
embedded HbbTV browser.
The result of this last experiment allowed us to illus-
trate a combined attack scenario, compromising a home
network due to lack of security in Smart-TVs and their
respective networks.
Table 10 summarizes the experiments that we have
carried out considering local loop and DVB broadcast
attacks. The results are detailed in the following sub-
sections.
Table 10 Experiments summary
1st experiment 2nd experiment
Local loop Software update Web-Browser &
Setup procedure analysis same-origin policy
DVB Setup
DVB Broadcast HbbTV Browser &
authentication same-origin policy
5.1 Local loop experiments
The first two experiments are carried out using our local
loop observation and service provider simulation plat-
forms. These experiments could easily have been carried
out on the local area network if the attacker was inside
the target home. By operating on the local loop, these
experiments demonstrate the possibility to remotely
compromise someone else’s TV. Indeed, operating di-
rectly on the copper pair local loop is technically more
complicated as it requires a specific hardware setup but
it presents a higher security impact, as it possibly al-
lows to compromise any home. The two experiments
we have choses only serve as an example, and we can
imagine many more attacks using this attack vector.
5.1.1 Smart-TV software update procedures
The first experiment carried out on our panel of smart-
TVs intends to analyze whether the communications
during a software update procedure are protected. Our
local loop observation platform (cf. Section 4.1.1) was
placed behind the IAD, allowing us to observe any com-
munication between the smart-TV and its online service
provider19. The results of this experiment are presented
in Table 11.
In each software update procedure, two phases are
distinguished. First, a “negotiation” phase that checks
19 In this particular case, the online service provider of a
smart-TV is considered as the servers belonging to the man-
ufacturer of the TV and proposing software updates.
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Table 11 Smart-TV software update procedures
Smart-TV A B C D
Negotiation
protocol HTTP HTTP + HTTPS HTTPS HTTP
content unknown XML + unknown unknown XML
Transfer
protocol HTTP unknown HTTP HTTP
content Binary unknown Binary Binary
if a more recent software version is available for this
Smart-TV. Secondly, if a newer version is available, a
“transfer” phase wherein the actual software is trans-
ferred. For each phase, we observed the protocols that
are used, and the type of content. Negotiation phases
of A, B and C are very similar, they either use the se-
cured HTTPS protocol, in which case the content is ci-
phered, or, when a non-secured protocol such as HTTP
is used, the content uses an unknown encoding and can
therefore also be considered as ciphered. The negotia-
tion phase of D uses the non-secured HTTP protocol
and its content is human readable XML. This allows
a classic “man-in-the-middle” attack to substitute the
URL leading to the new software and force the TV to
download a different software.
All observed software transfer phases use the non-
secured HTTP protocol, we were unable to observe the
transfer phase for TV B. For each of these TVs, we car-
ried out a “man-in-the-middle” attack simulating the
update server during this phase, proposing legitimate
but outdated software20. Smart-TVs A and C refused
our outdated software without specifying any reason. It
is likely that an anti-rollback mechanism is used. Smart-
TV D on the contrary accepted our outdated software.
This security breach allows any attacker to exploit any
previously corrected security flaws on this TV.
5.1.2 Smart-TVs and the same-origin security policy
The second experiment on our panel of smart-TVs is an
experience we carried out on both the local loop and the
DVB-T broadcast. On the DVB-T broadcast the results
of this experiment are siginifcant for our final combined
attack (cf. Section 5.2.3). In this section we show how
this attack vector also functions from the local loop.
This experiment intends to verify the compliance
of the integrated Web browser of each Smart-TV to
the same-origin security policy. During this experiment,
we connected each TV to our ISP simulator (cf. Sec-
tion 4.1.2). On our online service simulator, we hosted a
Web site containing malicious JavaScript code contain-
ing a CSRF21 attack. This JavaScript simply attempts
20 We downloaded and archived legitimate software from the
manufacturer’s Web-sites.
21 Cross Site Request Forgery, attacks that should be pre-
vented by the same-origin policy.
to perform a HTTP POST request on a different22 Web
site. When a Web browser fully complies to the same-
origin security policy, it must either first send out an
“OPTIONS” request, as shown in fig. 7, or in the worst
case simply ignore the request.
1) TV
GET javascript
Domain A
2) TV
Javascript
Domain A
3) TV
OPTIONS
Domain B
4) TV
NOK
Domain B
Fig. 7 Same-origin security compliant browser
Table 12 Smart-TV web browser and the same-origin policy
TV A B C D
Behaviour Ignore OPTIONS OPTIONS POST
Table 12 reports the behavior of our four Smart-
TVs. A, B and C are compliant to the same-origin se-
curity policy. D does not implement this security policy
and sends out the malicious POST request. This secu-
rity breach can be exploited by any phishing attack,
i.e., by imitating a popular Web site. In section 5.2.2
we will compare these results when testing HbbTV.
5.2 DVB broadcast experiments
This set of experiments was carried out using our DVB
observation and broadcast simulation platforms. They
are aimed at investigating if the content of a TV channel
is authenticated by a TV set.
DVB basically consists in broadcasting an MPEG
Transport Stream (TS) flow, which is a multiplex of
multiple Video, Audio and Data streams. DVB stipu-
lates[20] that an MPEG TS can contain multiple chan-
nels of different quality. Oren and Keromytis [19] pro-
pose a solution to compromise a stream at real-time
that requires directional antennas (cf. Section 4.2.3).
Our solution requires less hardware. Our experiments
use a pre-recorded part of the target multiplex. We then
use the same technique to modify the content of a sub-
stream in the multiplex. The effect of the modification
will be percieved by the end user who will notice a flash-
back in the TV program he is watching.
22 In XSS, we consider a different Web site as one having a
different Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).
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5.2.1 Compromising a DVB Broadcast
This first experiment intends to demonstrate that the
content of a DVB Broadcast is not authenticated and
that all our TVs correctly implement DVB specifica-
tions. In this experiment, we replace one of the video
streams by a live webcam video feed. All the TVs of
the test-panel ignore the legitimate signal when our
platform is activated, and instead, show the live we-
bcam feed. This experiment is achieved by recording
a short duration of a legitimate DVB broadcast. Using
our platform, we extracted one of the video streams out
of the multiplex and then inserted our own video source
instead. We obtained the same results when altering au-
dio or specific data streams in our DVB multiplex.
5.2.2 HbbTV and the same-origin security policy
Similarly to the experiment described in subsection
5.1.2, we tested the same-origin security policy com-
pliance using the HbbTV protocol. HbbTV allows
DVB to include Internet content in a multiplex, ei-
ther by multiplexing the entire Web page into the
broadcast, or by providing the URL allowing the
smart-TV to access the Web page using its Inter-
net connection. Same-origin policy issues are dis-
cussed in [19], where authors are concerned about
the possibility to define the origin when the Web
page is entirely multiplexed into the broadcast. In
this case, no origin is defined and a specific property,
simple application boundary descriptor[12, S6.3]
allows the malicious broadcaster to define its own ori-
gin. We tested the same-origin security policy on our 4
smart-TVs with and without specifying this property.
The results of these experiments are reported in Table
13.
Table 13 Smart-TV HbbTV and the same-origin policy
boundary descriptor A B C D
With POST Ignore OPTIONS OPTIONS
Without POST Ignore OPTIONS OPTIONS
These results are surprising and point out some
interesting facts. First, there is no difference whether
the simple application boundary descriptor prop-
erty is defined or not. This can be explained by the
TV introducing a FQDN23 when the Web page is em-
bedded in the DVB broadcast, this FQDN appears
in the origin headers as dvb://1.1.1.b. Therefore
23 Fully Qualified Domain Name
the simple application boundary descriptor prop-
erty is ignored because the application boundary can
only contain one FQDN[12, S6.3]. Secondly, in compar-
ison with the results of the experiments carried out in
Section 5.1.2, where the Web browser of A would re-
spect the same origin security policy by ignoring the
CSRF attack, it now accepts to execute the attack and
thereby ignores the security policy. On the other hand,
D now fully respects the same-origin security policy
while it did not in our previous experiment. Also B,
even though it still complies with the security policy,
behaves differently by ignoring the attack. This could
mean that at least A, B and D don’t use the same
rendering software engine for the normal Web browser
as for HbbTV. We exploited this security flaw on TV
A by multiplexing a Web page, containing malicious
JavaScript, directly into our malicious DVB signal24.
This JavaScript code sends out a UPNP request to the
local IAD, asking it to open specific ports to TV A.
Doing so allowed us to conduct attacks which were, up
to now, only feasible from the local area network.
5.2.3 Combined attack
Many related works discussed in Section 2 present spe-
cific vulnerabilities on different smart-TVs. Even if the
exploitation of such vulnerabilities is particularly inter-
esting for an attacker, their scope is often limited, due
to massive use of NAT techniques on home networks.
The usage of NAT limits direct access from the Inter-
net to devices connected through a local area network.
Therefore these attacks can only be executed from ma-
chines connected to the LAN, i.e, from inside the house.
The scope and the scale of these attacks may drasti-
cally change if they could be carried out from outside
the house, i.e., from the Internet. This could be possible
with the novel attack path described in Section 5.2.2.
Indeed, in this section, we presented a first exploita-
tion on a smart-TV using an attack path combining
the usage of a DVB broadcast and a home Internet
connection. One part of this attack consisted in forging
a UPNP request asking the local IAD to open a specific
port to the target device, as explained in the previous
section.
As an example, we forged a UPNP request in order
to open the port corresponding to a web service avail-
able on one of our smart-TVs, that allows to control the
TV like a remote control. In most use-cases, this web
service is only accessible from the local area network.
24 This attack can be achieved either by including the
JavaScript in a data carousel multiplexed into the DVB sig-
nal, or by supplying an URL pointing to an external Web
page containing this malicious code.
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Fig. 8 Combined attack
By carrying out our attack, we are now able to change
the volume and channel of the TV over the Internet.
In other words, this means that, by carrying out this
attack, an attacker is able to change the volume and
channel of any Smart TV of his choice, from the Inter-
net. In the same way, attacks described in Section 2,
requiring an access to the local network, also become
possible from the internet.
At a larger scale, this operation can be repeated in
order to open any other port. If we repeat this opera-
tion until we have opened all the available services on
a smart-TV to the Internet, the TV is no longer pro-
tected by NAT. Any attack25 which would up to now
require a direct access to the local area network, become
fully functional through the Internet. This means that
thanks to our attack path, many vulnerabilities could
be exploited remotely on a TV.
From there on, it is possible to imagine any kind of
attack on a home network. Indeed, once the attacker
gains control over the TV, he may use it as a gateway
in order to exploit vulnerabilities in any other smart de-
vice inside the home. As a consequence, the corruption
of a Smart TV from the Internet may possibly endanger
any other device connected to the home network. This
combined attack is described step by step in figure 8.
6 Countermeasures
The last module of the EBIOS method is dedicated to
security controls, in other words, the definition of coun-
termeasures to mitigate the risks identified during the
risk analysis. Considering the experiments discussed in
the previous sections, the attack scenarios that we have
identified are mainly related to: i) a lack of protection of
the communication channels, combined with ii) a lack
25 Attacks requiring broadcast packages will not function
over the Internet.
of enforcement of the same origin security policy by
the web-browsers involved in the interaction between
the smart-Tv and the service provider.
In this paper, we analyzed the security of two typ-
ical communication channels used by smart-TVs: i)
a bidirectional internet based-communication between
the Smart-TV and its online service provider, and ii) a
unidirectional communication for the aerial broadcast.
More generally, the problems raised are very similar
for any Internet connected device. During our experi-
ments we have noticed that the different communica-
tion channels used by a smart-TV, and especially those
communicating with their service providers do not al-
ways implement sufficient security measures, in partic-
ular to enforce protection against authenticity attacks.
More generally, each smart-device has n communica-
tion interfaces26 allowing data transmission to or re-
ception from another entity. Globally, for each link, and
for each security property27, the needs should be ana-
lyzed. Hence, each security criteria is not systematically
required on each communication channel and must be
studied individually.
By identifying the needs on each communication
channel it is possible to determine the corresponding
security measures. Several security methods exist on
different layers of the OSI model. For classic Internet
communication channels, most standard security mea-
sures are well-known and mature. For example, usage
of TLS on layer 4, IPSec on layer 3 or VPN tunnels on
either layers 3 and 4. Indeed, during our experiments
we have observed several devices integrating sufficient
and well configured security mechanisms on the Inter-
net communication channels. In most cases TLS is im-
plemented at the transport layer, and in some cases a
specific security mechanism is implemented at the ap-
plication layer. In either case, we consider these mech-
anisms are well known and do not need to be discussed
further, although we do consider their usage should be
more systematic. Considering aerial broadcast commu-
nications, to the best of our knowledge, security protec-
tion mechanisms have been seldom addressed. There-
fore, the rest of this section discusses existing security
mechanisms for DVB broadcasts. We firstly present the
protocol stack of an aerial TV broadcast, before iden-
tifying the different security mechanisms for each layer
of this stack.
26 We distinguish 5 main types of communication inter-
faces: human-machine (Keyboard, Screen), Peripheral (USB,
Firewire, WigBee), Remote service (DVB, PSTN), Internet
(xDSL, RJ45, Wifi, 3G) and Manufacturer (RS232, JTAG).
27 Availability, Integrity and Confidentiality, by extension,
the integrity of meta-data makes us consider Authenticity
aspects also.
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6.1 DVB protocol stack
In most cases, TV channels are transmitted on a one-
way communication channel. Since broadcasting on fre-
quencies reserved to television broadcasts, without a li-
cense, is forbidden in most countries, the definition of
the protocols used, is often less detailed. However, the
experience acquired during our experiments, allowed us
to distinguish 3 layers presented in Figure 9.
No No OSI Name Description
3 5-7 Application
Multimedia streams &
data
2 4 Transport DVB Multiplex
1 1-3 Physical
Definition of physical
transmission properties
Fig. 9 DVB stack
6.2 The higher layers
The higher layers of the DVB stack are independent
of the physical medium used. Therefore, the security
measures of these layers are identical for the different
DVB modes (DVB-S, DVB-C, DVB-T, ...).
On the higher layers only two security mechanisms
exist. The first mechanism to be considered is digi-
tal right management (DRM) for MPEG streams [6,7].
However, this mechanism doesn’t offer any protection
in terms of communication integrity or authenticity for
the end-user.
The second mechanism is directly related to Pay-TV
for which DVB uses the common scrambling algorithm
(CSA) [23]. This mechanism offers an access control
mechanism for pay-TV providers, using a symmetric
encryption mechanism. The encryption key is transmit-
ted together with the encrypted content, protected by
an asymmetric encryption mechanism. The user has a
smart card, capable of decrypting the encryption key
that is used to decrypt the TV channel. It is impossi-
ble for an attacker to replace an encrypted stream by
its own encrypted stream. Therefore, an attacker would
need to access a DVB-CSA3 encryption device, which
isn’t freely available.
6.3 The lower layers
The lower layers of a DVB broadcast depend on the
transport medium used. Considering DVB-T, used
for terrestrial aerial transmissions, the International
Telecommunications Union [15] defined thresholds in
order to avoid signal interference. This means that,
for an attack to succeed, the receiver must receive a
stronger signal during the attack. This can either be
achieved by increasing the transmission power, or by
approaching the malicious transmitter. This situation
is presented in Figure 10.
Legitimate transmitter
Malicious transmitter
User
re
ce
p
ti
o
n
a
n
te
n
n
a
∆dB ≥ ∆dBmin
∆dBmin = threshold defined by the protocol.
Fig. 10 Power difference of the received signal
The smart-TV could then alert the user if an ab-
normal situation is detected. This mechanism can only
function on relatively stable aerial transmissions. In-
deed, in situations where at least one of the two entities
of the communications constantly moves, such as with
mobile phones, such measures are not relevant.
6.4 Summary
From a security point of view, it is essential to improve
the DVB standards in order to integrate security mech-
anisms capable of guaranteeing the authenticity of com-
munication data inside a DVB broadcast. Such a mech-
anism could be similar to the way an Internet browser
functions, by validating the certificate of the transmit-
ter in a trusted list. This concept could be extended
by regularly including a signed checksum of the entire
multiplex, allowing a TV set to check the authenticity
of the entire DVB broadcast.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have first presented our application
of the EBIOS risk analysis method on smart-TVs. This
analysis allowed us to obtain a global vision of the main
risks any smart-TV may be concerned by. In the second
part of this paper, we carried out several experiments,
in order to check the feasibility of a new attack path
that allows remote vulnerability exploitation on Smart
devices in a home network. This new attack path was
instantiated on a panel of different types of commer-
cially available Smart TVs. Our experiments allowed us
to successfully 1) modify the software of some models
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of Smart TVs and 2) exploit a cross-site vulnerability
in HbbTV browsers of some models, which in turn can
be used to modify the UPNP configuration of the home
network IAD, opening a new remote access from the In-
ternet to the Smart TV. Finally, in the last part of this
paper, we studied some possible countermeasures to the
different weaknesses identified during these works.
During our experiments we have observed that most
standard IP communications are well protected. In-
deed, many Smart-TV manufacturers already use the
secure HTTPS protocol or other proprietary protection
mechanisms (encryption, signature, anti-rollback mech-
anism) in order to secure their software update process.
However, we have noticed that security is less well inte-
grated on other communication channels. In our case,
it was easy to compromise the DVB broadcast com-
munication. This communication should no longer be
ignored when considering the overall security of Smart-
TVs.
As future work, we plan to further investigate how
an attack, issued from a DVB network and targeting a
Smart TV, could propagate on the home network, and
in turn target other devices connected to this LAN.
We plan to conduct experiments aiming at building a
generic home network, including several connected de-
vices and analyzing these attack propagation possibil-
ities. This research topic is not specifically limited to
Smart TVs, and we plan to address this issue globally,
taking into account various families of connected de-
vices and all their network connections.
References
1. Altinyurt, E.U.: Samygo. http://www.samygo.tv. (vis-
ited on 2015-04-28)
2. Bachy, Y., Basse, F., Nicomette, V., Alata, E., Kaaˆniche,
M., Courrege, J.C., Lukjanenko, P.: Smart-tv security
analysis: practical experiments. In: Dependable Systems
and Networks (DSN), 2015 45th Annual IEEE/IFIP In-
ternational Conference on, pp. 497–504. IEEE (2015)
3. Basse, F.: Se´curite´ des ordivisions. In: proc. of Sympo-
sium sur la se´curite´ des technologies de l’information et
des communications (SSTIC). Rennes, France (2014)
4. Basse, F.: Te´le´visions connecte´es : Des objets branche´s
se´curite´ ? Multi-System and Internet Security Cookbook
(MISC) (2014)
5. Bogdan: Dvb-t implementation in gnuradio? part 2.
http://yo3iiu.ro/blog/?p=1220. (visited on 2015-04-
28)
6. Chen-Wei, F., Feng-Cheng, C., Hsueh-Ming, H.: An
MPEG-4 IPMPX design and implementation on MPEG-
21 test bed. In: International Symposium on Circuits
and Systems, 2005. ISCAS 2005., pp. 4550–4553 Vol. 5
(2005). DOI 10.1109/ISCAS.2005.1465644
7. Cho, Y., Seok, J., Hong, J., Ahn, C.: Broadcasting sys-
tem compliant with MPEG-2/4 IPMPX. Electronics and
Telecommunications Research Institute journal (ETRI)
26(2), 83–91 (2004)
8. Commission, E.: Special eurobarometer 438: E-
communications and the digital single market.
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/
S2062_84_2_438_ENG (2016). (visited on 2017-09-11)
9. Daemen, J., Rijmen, V.: The design of Rijndael: AES-
the advanced encryption standard. Springer Science &
Business Media (2002)
10. digitaltveurope.net: Smart tv sales
boost overall european market. http:
//www.digitaltveurope.net/349582/
smart-tv-sales-boost-overall-european-market/
(2015). (visited on 2015-10-02)
11. DoctorBeet: Lg smart tvs logging usb file-
names and viewing info to lg servers.
http://doctorbeet.blogspot.co.uk/2013/11/
lg-smart-tvs-logging-usb-filenames-and.html
(2013). (visited on 2015-04-28)
12. European Broadcasting Union: ETSI TS 102 796 V1.2.1
(November 2012)
13. Feamster, N.: Outsourcing home network security. In:
Proceedings of the 2010 ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on
Home Networks, HomeNets ’10, pp. 37–42. ACM, New
York, NY, USA (2010). DOI 10.1145/1851307.1851317.
URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1851307.1851317
14. Ghiglieri, M., Tews, E.: A privacy protection system for
hbbtv in smart tvs. In: Consumer Communications and
Networking Conference (CCNC), 2014 IEEE 11th, pp.
357–362 (2014). DOI 10.1109/CCNC.2014.6866595
15. International Telecommunication Union: Planning crite-
ria, including protection ratios, for digital terrestrial tele-
vision services in the vhf/uhf bands (2014)
16. Lodge, D.: Is your samsung tv listening to
you? http://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/
is-your-samsung-tv-listening-to-you/?_ga=1.
198058351.1988843124.1443693594 (2015). (visited on
2015-10-01)
17. van der Meulen, R., Rivera, J.: Gartner predicts live video
broadcasting will be the new “selfie” by 2017. http://
www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2934717 (2014). (visited
on 2015-10-02)
18. Michele, B., Karpow, A.: Watch and be watched: Com-
promising all smart tv generations. In: Consumer Com-
munications and Networking Conference (CCNC), 2014
IEEE 11th, pp. 351–356 (2014). DOI 10.1109/CCNC.
2014.6866594
19. Oren, Y., Keromytis, A.D.: From the aether to the
ethernet—attacking the internet using broadcast
digital television. In: 23rd USENIX Security Sympo-
sium (USENIX Security 14), pp. 353–368. USENIX
Association, San Diego, CA (2014). URL https:
//www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity14/
technical-sessions/presentation/oren
20. Reimers, U.: The dvb project-digital television for eu-
rope. In: DVB (Digital Video Broadcasting): The Future
for Television Broadcasting?), IEE Colloquium on (Di-
gest No.1995/142), pp. 1/1–1/7 (1995). DOI 10.1049/ic:
19950880
21. Sidiropoulos, N., Stefopoulos, P.: Smart tv hack-
ing. In: Research project 1. Amsterdam, Netherlands
(2013). URL http://delaat.net/rp/2012-2013/p39/
report.pdf
22. Stott, J.: The dvb terrestrial (dvb-t) specification and its
implementation in a practical modem. In: Broadcasting
Convention, International (Conf. Publ. No. 428), pp. 255–
260 (1996). DOI 10.1049/cp:19960816
23. Weinmann, R.P., Wirt, K.: Communications and Mul-
timedia Security: 8th IFIP TC-6 TC-11 Conference on
Smart-TV security 17
Communications and Multimedia Security, Sept. 15–18,
2004, Windermere, The Lake District, United Kingdom,
chap. Analysis of the DVB Common Scrambling Algo-
rithm, pp. 195–207. Springer US, Boston, MA (2005).
DOI 10.1007/0-387-24486-7 15. URL http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/0-387-24486-7_15
